time, parliament is dominated by MPs loyal to the government of the day. It has no constitutional role in foreign policymaking. The latest House of Commons Library report on the subject states explicitly that the prime minister directs the military, and is not obliged to consult parliament before doing so (Mills 2013, 3) . While some studies note that the vote over the Iraq war in March 2003 set a precedent for parliament to have a greater role (Bogdanor 2009, 225) , they usually conclude that the absence of supplementary legislation renders the precedent inert (Peters and Wagner 2013, 16) . The differentiated polity model, by contrast, sees policymaking more in terms of negotiation and coalitionbuilding (Rhodes 1997 , see also Marsh et al. 2001) . The British executive, according to this tradition, is constrained by institutional and political structures (Gaskarth 2013, 47) . Whatever the law might say about the power to take Britain to war, without institutional and political support no government can act entirely as it might wish (Joseph 2013, 1) . Parliament backed intervention in Iraq and Libya, but blocked action in Syria. Only on the latter occasion did it divide primarily along partisan lines, and even then some government MPs rebelled.
Ultimately I find the differentiated polity model more useful in explaining the growth of the parliamentary prerogative power, but I begin in a traditional vein by discussing the Westminster model, focusing on the legal basis of the power to deploy the armed forces. I note parliament's exclusion from formal decision-making, while recognising that prerogative powers can quite easily be amended or legislated away. I proceed through a detailed historical account to show the gradual development over the past decade of a clear link between parliamentary approval for the use of force, and its domestic political legitimacy. Building on the core insights of the differentiated polity model, I
highlight three historically-contingent factors, two derived from the foreign policy analysis literature, and one specific to the British case, which combined to boost parliament's role over this period; party politics and coalition-forming structures (Risse-Kappen 1991), leadership psychology (Foyle 1997) , and Britain's convention-driven constitutional structure (Heffernan 2003 , Bogdanor 2009 .
Individually these elements were insufficient to bring about a major change in the policymaking process. Their combined impact proved profound.
The informal nature of the parliamentary prerogative leaves its application in any one situation open to debate. In each of the Iraq, Libya, and Syria cases, the government proposed a large-scale, novel, extraordinary deployment of British military assets in the expectation that they would use deadly force. In colloquial terms we might describe these situations as states of 'war', although the term no longer has legal meaning (Joseph 2013, 2) , and I use the terms 'war', 'military action' and 'conflict' interchangeably throughout this piece.
Tradition: the Westminster model
According to the Westminster model, parliament has no role in decisions about the use of military force (Bowers 2003 , 2, House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 2006 , 8, Taylor and Kelly 2008 , 8, Mills 2013 , 1, Joseph 2013 . The legal authority to direct the armed forces rests with the prime minister as part of the royal prerogative, what AV Dicey termed 'the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown' (Dicey 1959, 424) . It is not subject to parliamentary approval, or open to judicial review (Joseph 2013) . The royal prerogative pre-dates British democracy, and in effect supersedes it. The unwritten British constitution's democratic elements represent in every case concessions made by absolute rulers over centuries of gradual change. Where no concession has been made, the ancient prerogative power remains in place. Where concessions are made, by contrast, through new precedents or legislation, change can be both dramatic and swift (Heffernan 2005a, 57) . The present coalition government, for example, gave up control over the timing of general elections in the Fixed Term Parliaments Act of 2011 (Bogdanor 2011, 107) . Because Britain has no comparable War Powers Act, according to the Westminster model, war powers remain part of the royal prerogative, and parliament has no say over how they are employed.
Parliament's role in foreign policy decision-making is limited by the royal prerogative. Even in the Westminster model, however, parliament retains some influence over foreign policy decisionmakers, although questions remain about how likely that influence is ever to be used given the loyalty most MPs show to party leaders. Britain's most fundamental constitutional principle is that a government must command majority support in the House of Commons (Bagehot 1936, 125) . Those that fail, fall. A government defeated on a confidence motion can no longer govern and must resign.
While MPs may not control the use of force overseas, they retain this 'nuclear option' of removing the government from office rather than swallowing unpopular decisions. This fallback power led William Wallace to term parliament a 'powerful constraint, a negative if not a positive force of considerable strength' (Wallace 1977, 98) . Parliament is powerful because the government depends on its support in order to survive. Its power is negative because it is purely reactive and destructive (Joseph 2013, 14) .
Most observers agree, furthermore, that parliament has long had the right at least to debate military actions (O'Donnell 2011 , Cabinet Office 2011 , 44, House of Lords Constitution Committee 2013c ). This right is significant, but it does not on its own constitute real influence. MPs may discuss a question without necessarily deciding it and, as Wallace warned, 'the appearance of debate and activity often serves to mask the ineffectiveness of parliament in holding the government to account' (Wallace 1977, 92) . Debates on military action typically take place through a technical process by which the government proposes to adjourn the House, the opposition objects, and MPs then discuss the issue of the day. Adjournment debates allow discussion without exposing actual policies to MPs' formal approval. Governments need not fear defeat, since any vote relates only to the question of the adjournment, and not to the policy itself. Adjournment debates offer MPs the chance to discuss matters beyond their formal purview, to air different points of view, to present arguments to the executive, to hear directly its response, and to express symbolic support for or opposition to its ultimate decision. Few would give up the right to an adjournment debate. But few would accept that it offers serious scope for democratic control over deployment decisions. The government is free to ignore the result of any vote. It can disregard the entire content of the debate if it sees fit. Since, under the Westminster model, adjournment debates are as close to influence over foreign affairs as MPs get, its adherents remain unsurprisingly sceptical about their impact.
The House of Commons held a substantive vote over military action on just one occasion during the 20 th century, over the Korean War. Winston Churchill argued a vote would prove that vocal parliamentary opponents of the war were unrepresentative (Hansard 1950 (Hansard , 2463 (Wallace 1977, 93) . That, indeed, is why when we speak of executive-legislative relations in Britain,
we really refer to the relationships between political leaders and their own parties (King 1976, 12 ).
Blair's power to move against Iraq was constrained primarily by the difficulty he faced winning over Labour rebels. One of the key insights the differentiated polity model offers is that no prime minister can exercise the formal authority of his office if his political base collapses (Heffernan 2005b, 618) .
That was Blair's problem. Facing calls for his resignation and aware of MPs' ultimate capacity to bring his government down, Blair concluded he had no choice but to allow a substantive vote before invading Iraq (Kettell 2006, 96) . He was constrained by political circumstances, and forced to pursue a coalition-building approach rather than simply issuing orders and expecting them to be obeyed.
That does not mean Blair held a weak hand. He both suffered and benefited from the dynamics of democratic rebellion. From a theoretical perspective, it was unsurprising that his government faced occasional rebellions, and not only because it pursued policies at odds with traditional Labour Party ideology. The party system grants leaders a number of tools to discipline dissent, of which the most significant is control over appointments. Yet prime ministers find their ability to proffer or threaten to withhold government jobs gradually declines as the back benches come to be dominated by 'ejected' ex-ministers and 'rejected' MPs who never became ministers (Benedetto and Hix 2007 than with the opposition, and so stood to lose more from a government collapse than from their own capitulation (Huber 1996, 269, Diermeir and Feddersen 1998, 611) . By making the Iraq question into a confidence motion, Blair forced Labour MPs who opposed war but otherwise supported the government to choose between the two. Ultimately a majority preferred to overthrow Saddam Hussein than to overthrow Tony Blair (Runciman 2004 , 13-14, Coates and Krieger 2009 , 251, Powell 2010 . (Blair 2010 , 117, 157, Powell 2010 . Stephen Dyson found that Blair in office exhibited 'a high belief in his ability to control events, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need for power' (Dyson 2006, 289) . Blair liked to be in charge. He preferred black-and-white judgements to shades of grey. His belief in his own judgement helped sustain him through the confrontation with his party over Iraq. It gave him faith that his chosen course was right.
It is the central reason why he took such a prominent role in British foreign policymaking, and when combined with his considerable ambition helps explain why he spent so much energy and effort on grand international designs (Hennessey 2000, 387) . Even the Iraq vote itself encapsulated Blair's optimistic, borderline reckless, approach. While making it a confidence motion helped discipline dissenters, it also opened him up to the very real prospect of politically fatal defeat. Cameron is more consensual in style and more cautious in substance, in part because he heads a coalition government.
While Blair excluded Cabinet from the key decisions over Iraq (Short 2010 Cameron did not need to be forced into allowing parliament a say. In contrast to Blair, he quickly confirmed that parliament would get a substantive vote. These were differences of style rather than substance; both leaders gave MPs the chance to veto their decisions. Cameron simply did it less grudgingly than Blair. Yet the stylistic difference helped set the tone for the debate that followed.
Even before the UN Security Council agreed Resolution 1973 in March 2011, ministers assured MPs that the government would seek their approval for any military action that followed (Hansard 2011a (Hansard , 1066 . With UNSCR 1973 in hand, Cameron based his case for British participation on the UN mandate, the need to protect civilians from imminent and demonstrable danger, and the insistence that no British ground troops would be used. In case the message was insufficiently clear, he spelt it out:
'this is not another Iraq' (Hansard 2011b, 700, 709, 710) . Parliament, and the press (cf. The Economist, 24 March 2011), agreed, and MPs approved the motion by 557 votes to 13. It was a significant moment. While the prospects of defeat had never been high, Cameron's decision to copy opposition by asking anti-war MPs to call for forces already in action to be withdrawn, a more damaging proposition than never deploying them in the first place. Several MPs complained about this (Hansard 2011b, 749, 752, 771) . They made a good point. The timing of a vote matters. It is one of the critical points left unresolved by the conventional nature of the parliamentary prerogative that could yet be cleared up by legislation (Joseph 2013, 105 were not asked to vote to withdraw troops already in combat (Hansard 2011b , 752, 779, cf. House of Lords Constitution Committee 2013b . This was itself a major concession, given that the question of the timing of a vote has been constantly at the heart of debates over parliament's role in deployment decisions. It was also a concession that the government honoured in 2013. Council can grant (Kettell 2006 , 96, Ralph 2013 ). Yet the significance of the Syria vote lies not only in the fact that it was lost, but also in the fact that it took place at all. For the third time in a row a government sought parliamentary approval before using force overseas. In common with the vote over Iraq, and in contrast with that over Libya, the government faced a very real prospect of defeat. That it was defeated only serves to underline the gradual growth of parliamentary influence in this critical area. While the prime minister retains the legal freedom to direct the armed forces as he sees fit, in terms of practice parliament now wields a political veto over that freedom.
Conclusion: The new parliamentary prerogative
The conventional nature of the prerogative requires debate in future over the extent to which a particular decision triggers its invocation (Bogdanor 2009, 225) . Each parliament must re-interpret the conventions of its predecessors. In this way, the political elements of the British constitutional settlement rely more on evolution than innovation, on a quasi-organic growth process that can be accelerated, slowed, halted, or reversed as circumstances demand (Burch and Holliday 2004, 1) . They can change quickly and without fanfare as the accumulation of individual precedents gradually alters past conventions (Foley 2004 , 301-302, Bogdanor 2009 , 224, Joseph 2013 it, and that legitimacy matters more than any purely legal argument in the contemporary foreign policy environment.
